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For the Japanese, the upcoming attacks on the Midway Islands had little to do with the islands themselves and everything to do with a singular goal: luring the remnants of the American fleet into the “loving arms” of the vastly superior Japanese fleet. All the American battleships were either under repair or under the waters of Pearl Harbor, which left aircraft carriers as the only force projection left to the U.S. Navy. The mission against Midway was specifically designed to draw out, and defeat, those carriers.
A little-known facet of the Midway mission was designed to allow the Japanese to spy on Pearl Harbor and keep track of the carriers. Called “Operation K”, it involved parking submarines at the French Frigate Shoals, a crescent-shaped reef in the Hawaiian chain less than 500 miles northwest of Pearl Harbor. Japanese float planes would fly in from Kwajalein, stop to be refueled by the subs, then fly on to Hawaii. All in all, a pretty clever plan.
Clever…except for two tiny problems. First, the Japanese had pulled this trick before in March, and the U.S. Navy now knew about it. Second, because the Navy was reading Japanese coded ciphers, it was aware of an impending operation against Midway, and realized the French Frigate Shoals might again be useful to the Japanese. So when the Japanese sub I-121 arrived on May 26th, a U.S. Navy seaplane tender was there to greet it.
Later joined by two more submarines (I-122 & I-123), the trio could do nothing for three days but lurk quietly, avoid detection, and wait. Communications went back and forth and the rendevouz with the planes was moved back a day, to May 31st. But late on the 30th, Toshitake Ueno, the commander of I-123 (and overall commander of the subs), raised his periscope again…to see two ships sitting there.
It was hopeless. Allowing the planes to fly in would be a dead giveaway. Sinking the U.S. ships, however easy, would also be a dead giveaway. There was nothing to do but cancel the operation. And so, just before midnight on May 30, 1942, Operation K was shelved.
But in doing so, the Japanese Navy committed a colossal error. Desiring radio silence and surprise above all else, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto did not warn Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, head of the First Carrier Striking Force bearing down on Midway, of the change. So Nagumo could only assume that the U.S. carriers were berthed safely at Pearl Harbor. In truth, not only had the carriers Enterprise and Hornet already left port, but the Yorktown (thought by the Japanese to have been sunk in the Coral Sea), had been made sea-worthy again and would join the fracas.
Operation K was a small part of the Midway plan, the failure of which would have dire consequences for the Japanese just five days hence.
Recommended Reading: Incredible Victory – The Battle of Midway – There are so many great accounts of this decisive battle, it’s hard to pick one. Fortunately, you don’t have to.
