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U.S. and British troops had landed on the island of Sicily during the late evening and early morning of July 9-10, 1943. Codenamed Husky, the operation had as its goal the removal (by whatever means necessary) of the Italian and German military. Having done that, the island would be the staging area for the bigger drive into Italy, the “Soft Underbelly of Europe”.
General Bernard Montgomery led the British 8th Army, which landed on the southeast side of Sicily. General George Patton’s U.S. 7th Army landed on the south-central part of the island, near Gela. Needless to say, it didn’t take long for the hard-charging U.S. General to tire of what he thought was a stagnant, play-it-way-too-safe style of warfare being run by the Commander of the land forces, General Alexander (also a Brit).
So, on July 17th, Patton flew to Allied headquarters in Tunisia, tracked down Alexander, pointed to the northwest corner of Sicily on his map, and said (not a direct quote), “How about I take Palermo?” As the capital of Sicily, it had been where the American leaders had wanted to land in the first place. But Montgomery and Alexander disagreed and General Eisenhower (in overall command and desirous of coalition harmony) backed Alexander’s plan. Alexander considered Patton’s idea, and gave him the go-ahead.
And like racehorses out of the gate at Churchill Downs, Patton’s men were off, ripping through the countryside, capturing lightly defended towns and taking prisoners. In fact, before asking permission, the man with the .45 on his hip had already allowed a large number of forces to begin moving and taking some of the smaller towns between Gela and the capital, 80 miles away. As it turned out, Alexander later countermanded the orders, but Patton ignored him, blaming garbled messages.
By the morning of July 22, 1943, the 7th Army was on the outskirts of Palermo, but was forbidden to enter the city. Patton, whose over-sized ego and vanity often got the best of him, wanted to lead a tank processional into the capital. There would be little or no fighting as most of the enemy had already left town and headed east. At 6pm (after waiting all day), several battalions were sent into the city and later in the evening, an Italian General overstepped his authority and surrendered the city.
The fall of Palermo was mostly symbolic and was accomplished with relatively little combat. It’s military importance lies mostly with how the enemy perceived it. With the British moving (slowly) towards Messina from the south and the western part of the island in U.S. hands, the Italians and Germans realized that Sicily could no longer be defended, and a retreat from the island was now on the cards.
Recommended Reading: The Day of Battle
Great posting.
I’d also recommend Patton’s “War As I Knew It” for learning more about the battle. His journal gives a lot of insight from his perspective of the battles fought in Sicily.
Thank for reading…and responding. And your recommendation of Patton’s book is well made.
Regards,
Joel
There was a big difference between Patton’s advance on Palermo and Monty’s advance towards Messina. Patton went through more level land and face little to no opposition while Montgomery advanced up the strong Etna lines of defences against the bulk of the German forces. The speed of advance between the two must, therefore, be weighted against the region of advance and the strenght of opposition.
It is worth noting that once Montgomery saw Patton was in a better position to do so he suggested that Patton take Messina. In addition the order from Alexander, having accepted Monty’s suggestion, for Patton to go to Messina was recieved before Patton got to Palermo but was deliberately withheld from him by his chief of staff so that Patton could get the glory of taking the Sicilian capitol, leading the US 3rd division commander to later remark that Patton was only interested in getting that glory.
Marty,
Palermo being lightly defended is exactly the point. Patton wanted to take an easier and faster route to Messina. What this proves is the supierority of Patton’s plan to that of Montgomery.
Powerman
I’m not criticising Patton for going the a more raound-about route to Messina through Palermo, I was pointing out that the speed of advance for Patton was always going to be quicker than Monty’s becuase Patton was going through better tank country against little to no opposition while Monty was advancing against strong defensive positions with dug in German troops opposing him.
“We took the northwest corner of Sicily. It was a pleasure march…Nicest war I’ve ever been in!” General Maxwell Taylor, the artillery chief of the 82nd US Airbourne Division, said of the Sicily Campaign. “Monty – he had a different problem – he was up against Germans.”
Furthermore Patton did not have a overall plan in place for the Sicily Campaign. He was only one army commander under Harold Alexander – it was Alexander’s job to deal with the overall plan, a job he failed to do – and once it became clear to him that Alexander was not going to give him a central role he decided to take matters into his own hand and head to Palermo. He had no intention of turning east and heading to Messina once he had taken Palermo, all he had planned to do was take the capital.
Montgomery was disgusted and dissappointed by the lack of grip and attention being displayed by the Allied High Command and took matters into his own hands as well. Convincing Alexander to change tactics when he felt needed – clearly demonstrated in his getting Alexander to order Patton to take Messina.
“The trouble is there is no high up grip on this campaign,” Monty bemoaned on 7th August 1943. “It beats me how anyone thinks he can run a campaign in this way, with the three Commanders of the three services [army, navy and air force] about 600 miles from each other. The enemy should never be allowed to get all his equiment out of Sicily, and we should round up the bulk of his fighting troops…but such a plan does not exist.”
The Allied High Command’s failure to have a clear overall plan, commanded by a confident and decisive commander, coordinating all three services of arms led to a completely mismanaged campaign and this in turn led to both Monty and Patton going off on their own and doing their own things. Neither had a overall plan in place for Sicily so Patton’s “plan” cannot have been superior to Monty’s because neither had one.
Great account. I want to point out that most of the world saw Patton as egotistical and a reincarnationist, a misinterpretation of his real personality. Patton was an intimidator and tremendously confident. He was determined to intimidate the enemy by making himself and his army appear invincible. It worked. As for the reincarnation, Patton was so steeped on his studies of those who had gone before that he felt as though he had been there, and perhaps he had been, in spirit.